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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over the instant 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (e) . 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES / STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court erred in concluding that Officer 
Scott had reasonable suspicion that Defendant had either committed a 
crime, was in the act of committing a crime, or was attempting to 
commit a crime when Defendant merely made a right-hand turn with his 
full-size, three-quarter ton truck onto 250 North. The 
"determination of whether a specific set of facts gives rise to 
reasonable suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
4 
nondeferentially for correctness." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994); see also State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1272 (Utah 
1993); State v. Bello, 871 P.2d 584, 586 (Utah Ct. App. ) , cert. 
denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). This issue was preserved by way 
of appointed trial counsel's motion to suppress together with the 
evidence and argument presented at the suppression hearing (R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing). 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 16 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and 
regulations, whose interpretation is determinative, are set out 
verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body and arguments of 
the instant brief, 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
By way of Information October 23, 1997, Defendant was charged 
with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a 
class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44, Open 
Container of Liquor In or About a Vehicle, a class C misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20, and Driving a Motor Vehicle 
With a Suspended License, a class B misdemeanor, violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 53-3-227. Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a motion 
to suppress, which was heard by the trial court on February 3, 1998, 
and denied by way of an unsigned Minute Entry that same day. 
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Defendant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, 
subject to the right to appeal the trial court's denial of the motion 
to suppress. On March 16, 1998, counsel for both Defendant and the 
prosecution executed a Stipulated Plea of Defendant, which was 
entered on March 20, 1998. The trial court, on March 17, 1998, 
signed the Order Allowing Stipulated Plea of Defendant, which was 
entered on March 20, 1998. On March 17, 1998, Defendant was 
sentenced. Defendant filed a Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence on 
March, 20, 1998. Thereafter, on March 31, 1998, the trial court 
signed its Judgment, which was entered on April 2, 1998. Defendant 
filed Notice of Appeal on April 23, 1998. Pursuant to a previously 
filed Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence and Certificate of 
Probable Cause, the trial court on or about April 27, 1998, granted 
the Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence by signing a Certificate of 
Probable Cause to Stay Execution of Sentence. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On September 21, 1997, at approximately 9:00 p.m., 
Defendant, who was driving a 1977 full-size, three-quarter ton Ford 
truck with a camper shell on the back (see R. 68, Transcript of 
Hearing, p. 27, lines 3-9), stopped at the Arctic Circle in 
Clearfield, Utah, and placed an order for food (Id. at R. 68, p. 4, 
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lines 4-9, p. 5, lines 12-17, p. 10, lines 13-18, p. 13, lines 20-21); 
2. Ms. Lisa Smith, Assistant Manager of Arctic Circle in 
Clearfield, Utah, apparently viewed Defendant at the time Defendant 
entered the Arctic Circle (Id. at R. 68, p. 4, lines 12-13). In the 
course of doing so, Ms. Smith allegedly saw Defendant have difficulty 
both opening the door to the restaurant and walking {Id. at R. 68, 
pp. 3-4). Ms. Smith also testified that Defendant "smelled of 
alcohol really bad." {Id. at R. 68, p. 4, lines 1-2),-1 
3. While Defendant was being served, Ms. Smith called the 
police and spoke with the dispatcher (Id. at R. 68, p. 4, lines 14-
19, p. 5, lines 22-25);2 
4. Because Ms. Smith was not where she could see Defendant 
while she was speaking with police dispatch (id. at R. 68, p. 5, 
lines 4-6), Ms. Smith had to keep putting dispatch on hold - going 
back and forth from the back of the restaurant where the telephone is 
located to the front of the restaurant to see Defendant during the 
conversation with police dispatch (Id. at R. 68, p. 5, lines 6-11); 
2At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Ms. Smith testified 
that Defendant exhibited slurred speech (R. 68, Transcript of 
Hearing, p. 8, lines 14-16). Later however, during that same direct 
examination, Ms. Smith admitted that she did not tell police dispatch 
about the slurred speech (Id. at R. 68, p. 9, lines 15-17). 
2Ms. Smith's telephone call to the police appears to have been 
out of concern for public safety (See R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, 
p. 4, lines 21-24) . 
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5. Ms. Smith spoke with police dispatch until Defendant pulled 
out of the restaurant and drove away [Id. at R. 68, pp. 5-6);3 
6. While on patrol, Officer Tim Scott, a patrol officer for 
Clearfield City, received information from police dispatch that there 
was an "intoxicated subject" at the Arctic Circle restaurant, which 
the complainant believed was driving away (Id. at R. 68, pp. 12-13); 
7. Officer Scott responded by parking at a convenience store 
across from the restaurant (Id. at R. 68, p. 13, lines 10-16). While 
parked, Officer Scott observed a truck similar to that described by 
the tip provided to police dispatch by Ms. Smith, which was parked in 
a stall (Id. at R. 68, p. 13, lines 20-25); 
3The following exchange between Ms. Smith and the prosecutor took 
place in the course of direct examination: 
MR. HARWARD: Did you see an officer arrive? 
MS. SMITH: I seen [sic] one pull. They said they had 
someone set across the street, so I had an 
employee watch to see if someone did pull out, a 
police officer pull out somewhere and they did. 
MR. HARWARD: What did you observe when the police officer 
arrived? Did you see it? 
MS. SMITH: See, he pulled out. He pulled out of my 
restaurant and that's when we saw the cop follow 
him. 
MR. HARWARD: So --
MS. SMITH: Do you know what I'm saying? 
MR. HARWARD: You saw Mr. McBride driving away? 
MS. SMITH: Right. 
MR. HARWARD: You saw a police officer following Mr. McBride's 
vehicle? 
MS. SMITH: Yes. We thought it was the one cuz we just saw 
a cop. Right when he pulled we saw a cop 
following. 
MR. HARWARD: But you were still on the phone? 
MS. SMITH: Right. 
(R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, p. 6, lines 3-21). 
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8. Officer Scott observed Defendant leave the restaurant and 
enter the vehicle that Officer Scott had been watching (Id. at R. 68, 
p. 14-15). In the course of watching Defendant's vehicle, Officer 
Scott did not ''notice anything unusual" as Defendant walked from the 
restaurant and got into his vehicle {Id. at R. 68, p. 15, lines 12-
14) ;4 
4The following testimony of Office Scott at the suppression 
hearing is instructive as to the course of events as well as the 
actions of Officer Scott upon responding to the police dispatch 
report: 
MR, HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR, HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR, HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
What did you see? 
I observed a brown truck like described by 
Miss Smith with a camper shell on the back. 
The truck I note as I was passing that the 
lights were on and to the best of my 
knowledge the truck was running. It wasn't 
cold enough for exhaust fumes, but the 
lights weren't dimmed in any way. It was 
parked in a stall. It looked like it was 
running. 
You didn't see anyone in it? 
I didn't. 
You observed --
What's that? 
So you made an observation? 
I did. 
What did you see? 
When I drove past the truck I could see 
through the driver's window clear through 
to the passenger side. The cab in the back 
or the camper shell in the back, I couldn't 
see into that, but I could see the cab. I 
didn't see anyone inside the truck. 
Were you still in contact with the 
dispatch? 
Correct. 
Were you receiving additional information? 
Yes. 
What was the additional information? 
That the subject was still inside the 
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MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
• * * * 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
OFFICER SCOTT: 
MR. HARWARD: 
store. I told dispatch that I was in the 
area. And I believe, I don't recall, but I 
believe dispatch told me that the subject 
was leaving. 
Did you see him leave the store? 
I did. 
And you recognize Mr. McBride as being that 
person? 
I do. 
Did you see him enter that vehicle you'd 
been watching? 
I did. 
Describe? 
I observed he exited the store. When he 
exited the store I was waiting to see if in 
fact he was going to go to the vehicle to 
the passenger side or to the driver's side. 
When he went to the driver's side I didn't 
really focus on how he did that or what 
took place going to the driver's side 
because I exited -- tried to exit that 
parking lot to get across the street. My 
intention. 
You didn't notice anything unusual as you 
got in the car? 
I didn't. 
Did you receive a confirmation from the 
dispatcher that that was the person 
involved? 
No. 
Did you receive any more information from 
the dispatcher as you -- after you watched 
him get into the truck? 
I don't recall. 
What did you do? 
The truck backed and pulled out of the 
driveway at Arctic Circle. I pr6ceeded out 
of the driveway across the street. Pulled 
in behind the travel lane behind that 
truck. 
Were you still in contact with the 
dispatcher? 
I don't recall. 
What did you do? 
10 
9. Not only was there nothing unusual observed by Officer 
Scott in the course of observing Defendant exit the restaurant and 
enter his vehicle, Officer Scott failed to receive any confirmation, 
whatsoever, from police dispatch that Defendant was in fact the 
person involved in the complaint (Id. at R. 68, p. 15, lines 12-17) ;5 
10. As Defendant pulled out of Arctic Circle restaurant on 300 
North onto Main Street, Officer Scott also pulled out of the 
convenience store and followed Defendant southbound (Id. at R. 68, p. 
16, lines 10-12). Officer Scott did not initiate a stop of 
Defendant's truck until after Defendant made a right-hand turn onto 
250 North (Id. at R. 68, p. 16, lines 12-13);6 
11. While following Defendant's truck, Officer Scott allegedly 
observed Defendant make a right-hand turn "from the center lane 
OFFICER SCOTT: I followed the vehicle. The vehicle was 
southbound on Main Street from that 
restaurant. Arctic Circle is 300 North. 
The vehicle made a right-hand turn on to 
250 North and then I initiated a traffic 
stop. 
(R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, pp. 13-16). 
5At the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, Officer Scott did not 
recall whether he received any further information from police 
dispatch after watching Defendant enter his truck (Id. at R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing, p. 15, lines 22-24), p. 16, lines 4-8). 
6Officer Scott testified at the hearing on the Motion to Suppress 
that the road on which Defendant was driving when making the turn had 
two standard width road lanes with a parking lane on each side of the 
street in addition to a center lane (R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, p. 
16, lines 19-21, p. 19, lines 22-25) . 
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marker." (Id. at R. 68, p. 16, lines 21-24).7 Officer Scott 
considered this an improper turn and expressly initiated the stop of 
Defendant's truck for this reason (Id. at R. 68, p. 16-17);8 
12. Upon approaching Defendant's truck, Officer Scott allegedly 
smelled an odor of alcohol coming from the open window of the truck 
(Id. at R. 68, p. 17, lines 16-18) . Officer Scott also allegedly 
thought that Defendant had the appearance of being intoxicated (Id. 
at R. 68, p. 17, lines 18-22); 
13. By way of Information filed October 23, 1997, Defendant was 
charged with Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
70n cross examination, Officer Scott admitted that Defendant, in 
the course of making the right-hand turn, did not cross any lane of 
travel (R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, p. 21, lines 1-3). In fact, 
Defendant testified that due to the nature of his full-size three-
quarter ton truck, a turn too close to the corner would cause his 
rear wheels to jump the curb and sidewalk, creating a risk to the 
public by potentially making the front-end of the truck go into the 
oncoming lane of traffic {Id. at R. 68, pp. 23-24). Defendant 
further testified that in the course of making the turn, he attempted 
uto remain as close to the curb side as [he] could in making the turn 
. . . and still remain in [his] lane of traffic once [he] completed 
the turn, especially in light of the parked cars situated on 250 
North (Id. at R. 68, p. 24, lines 12-19) . Further support for 
Defendant's testimony is found in Ms. Smith's testimony at the 
suppression hearing where she testified that Defendant's truck is a 
big truck (Id. at R. 68, p. 10, lines 13-18) . 
80n direct examination, the following exchange took place between 
the prosecutor and Officer Scott concerning Officer Scott's reason 
for making the stop: 
MR. HARWARD: You observed the improper right-hand turn? 
OFFICER SCOTT: I did. 
MR. HARWARD: Was it because of that that you initiated 
the stop? 
OFFICER SCOTT: Yes. On 2 50 North. 
(R. 68, Transcript of Hearing, pp. 16-17). 
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Drugs, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
44, Open Container of Liquor In or About a Vehicle, a class C 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44.20, and Driving 
a Motor Vehicle With a Suspended License, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (R. 1-3, Information); 
14. On December 7, 1997, Defendant appeared with counsel for 
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the charges (R. 11, Minute 
Entry - Notice); 
15. Shortly thereafter, Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
(R. 13-14, Motion to Suppress Evidence), which was heard by the trial 
court on February 3, 1998 (R. 68, Transcript of Hearing); 
16. After the hearing on the Motion to Suppress, the trial 
court, without taking the matter under advisement, denied the motion, 
which is reflected in the court's unsigned Minute Entry dated that 
same day (R. 26-27, Minute Entry - Notice) . Upon announcing its 
ruling, the trial court requested the prosecutor to "prepare findings 
and order in accordance with [the trial court's] ruling" (R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing, p. 30, lines 2-3);9 
17. Defendant thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea to 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B 
misdemeanor, subject to the right to appeal the trial court's denial 
9The record contains no such findings of fact or conclusions of 
law as requested by the trial court. 
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of the motion to suppress (R. 71, Transcript of Sentencing, p. 2, 
lines 19-24) ; 
18. On March 16, 1998, counsel for both Defendant and the 
prosecution executed a Stipulated Plea of Defendant, which was 
entered on March 20, 1998 (R. 34, Stipulated Plea of Defendant) . The 
trial court, on March 17, 1998, signed the Order Allowing Stipulated 
Plea of Defendant, which was also entered on March 20, 1998 (R. 35, 
Order Allowing Stipulated Plea of Defendant); 
19. On March 17, 1998, Defendant was sentenced to six months in 
the Davis County Jail, which the trial court stayed, placing 
Defendant on probation subject to conditions that included Defendant 
spending five months in the Davis County Jail and a review after 
serving 12 0 days for an inpatient alcohol treatment program (R. 40, 
Judgment); 
20. Defendant, through appointed trial counsel, filed a Motion 
to Stay Execution of Sentence on March, 20, 1998 (R. 33, Motion to 
Stay Execution of Sentence); 
21. Thereafter, on March 31, 1998, the trial court signed its 
Judgment, which was entered on April 2, 1998 (R. 39-40, Judgment); 
22. Defendant filed Notice of Appeal on April 23, 1998 (R. 45-
47, Notice of Appeal); 
23. On April 27, 1998, the trial court granted Defendant's 
Motion to Stay Execution of Sentence by signing a Certificate of 
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Probable Cause to Stay Execution of Sentence (R. 49-51, Certificate 
of Probable Cause to Stay Execution of Sentence). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court erred by concluding that Officer Scott had 
a reasonable suspicion to believe Defendant committed or was about to 
commit a crime prior to stopping Defendant when Defendant merely made 
a right-hand turn with his full-size three-quarter ton truck, which 
had a camper shell on it, prior to the seizure and investigative 
questioning by Officer Scott. Notwithstanding Officer Scott's 
testimony, which merely referred to an allegedly improper right-hand 
turn by Defendant that Officer Scott admitted did not cross any other 
lane of travel, he could not point to or articulate any specific 
objective facts to support reasonable suspicion. Because Officer 
Scott did not articulate reasonable objective facts for suspecting 
that Defendant had engaged in or was about to engage in criminal 
conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime prevention 
and constitutional right of Defendant to personal security and 
privacy tilts in favor of Defendant to protect him from the 
unreasonable police interference. The seizure by Officer Scott of 
Defendant's truck was unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment and the evidence obtained as a result of the seizure should 
be suppressed. 
15 
ARGUMENTS 
I. BECAUSE OFFICER SCOTT DID NOT ACT FORTHWITH UPON 
RECEIVING THE TIP PROVIDED TO POLICE DISPATCH BUT 
INSTEAD DELAYED HIS APPROACH PRIOR TO THE SEIZURE OF 
DEFENDANT'S TRUCK AND BECAUSE OFFICER SCOTT EXPRESSLY 
BASED SUCH SEIZURE ON GROUNDS OTHER THAN THOSE 
PROVIDED BY THE INFORMANT, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY 
CONCLUDING THAT OFFICER SCOTT HAD REASONABLE SUSPICION 
THAT DEFENDANT COMMITTED OR WAS ABOUT TO COMMIT A 
CRIME 
Because the Fourth Amendment10 analysis of police officer conduct 
is fact sensitive, the facts are reviewed in detail. State v. 
Jackson, 805 P.2d 765, 766 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v. Sierra, 754 
P.2d 972, 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Fourth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution mandates that people have the right to be 
secure in their persons and effects against unreasonable searches and 
seizures. Accordingly, the Fourth Amendment functions to "prevent 
arbitrary and oppressive interference by enforcement officials with 
the privacy and personal security of individuals." United States v. 
Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S.Ct. 1870, 1877 (1980) 
(citations omitted). Because the demarcations in cases involving the 
Fourth Amendment are often difficult to apply, the appellate court 
"must not only balance the competing interests of the individual and 
the State but also carefully consider the facts and circumstances of 
10The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution states 
that u[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated . . . ." 
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each particular case." State v. Menke, 787 P.2d 537, 540 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
A car stop and investigatory detention of its occupants is a 
"seizure" under the protective principles of the Fourth Amendment to 
the United States Constitution. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 
648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); State v. Case, 884 P.2d 1274, 
1276 (Utah Ct. App. 1994); Kaysville City v. Mulcahy, 943 P.2d 231, 
234 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In order to survive the Fourth Amendment 
proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures, the stop 
must satisfy a two-part test. "First, the officer's initial stop 
must be justified; second, subsequent actions must be within the 
scope of the circumstances justifying the stop." Case, 884 P.2d at 
1276 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 
(1968)). The instant case involves only the first part of the test. 
A stop of a vehicle is justified if a police officer has 
reasonable suspicion11 that a person is engaging in criminal behavior. 
Id. " * [T] he police officer must be able to point to specific and 
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from 
those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.'" Menke, 787 P.2d 
xlUtah codified this constitutionally mandated "reasonable 
suspicion" at Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-15, which states: 
A peace officer may stop any person in a public 
place when he has a reasonable suspicion to 
believe he has committed or is in the act of 
committing or is attempting to commit a public 
offense and may demand a name, address and an 
explanation of his actions. 
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at 541 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880); See also 
State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); and State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984)). The "totality of the 
circumstances approach is used to determine if there are sufficient 
'specific and articulable facts' to support reasonable suspicion." 
Case, 884 P. 2d at 1276 (citation omitted) . Moreover, the State bears 
the burden to establish the articulable facts to support reasonable 
suspicion. See id. 
While the articulable facts supporting reasonable suspicion are 
usually based upon an officer's personal perceptions and inferences, 
in some instances the officer may rely upon external information such 
as an informant's tip by way of police dispatch. Id. at 1276-77; see 
also State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 940 (Utah 1994) ("Under certain 
circumstances, police officers can rely on a dispatched report in 
making an investigatory stop."). A police officer in receipt of a 
dispatched report "may take it at face value and act on it 
forthwith."12 Case, 884 P. 2d at 1277-78) (emphasis added) . 
12Black's Law Dictionary defines "Forthwith" in the following 
manner: 
Immediately; without delay; directly; within a 
reasonable time under the circumstances of the 
case; promptly and with reasonable dispatch. 
Within such time as to permit that which is to 
be done, to be done lawfully and according to 
the practical and ordinary course of things to 
18 
" [W]hether a specific set of facts gives rise to a reasonable 
suspicion is a determination of law and is reviewable 
nondeferentially for correctness." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939 
(Utah 1994). As a result, the reviewing court does not defer to the 
trial court's determination. See id. 
The instant case is not a case where a police officer relied 
upon the information provided by an informant's tip to make an 
investigatory stop. See, e.g., State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1992). Instead, Officer Scott, upon responding to the police 
dispatch report, deliberately delayed any action in terms of 
effectuating a stop or seizure of Defendant based upon the 
information provided by way of Ms. Smith to police dispatch (R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing, pp. 13-16). Rather than immediately 
approaching Defendant based on the information provided to police 
dispatch, Officer Scott disregarded the dispatch report and sat back 
in the patrol car parked across the street from the restaurant, 
observing Defendant walk out of the restaurant towards his truck, 
enter his truck, back his truck out of the parking stall, and drive 
his truck out of the restaurant onto a public roadway {Id.). Only 
then did Officer Scott then pull out of the convenience store parking 
lot across the street from the restaurant, where he was stationed, 
be performed or accomplished. The first 
opportunity offered. 
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 588 (5th ed. 1979). 
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and follow Defendant apparently to observe Defendant's driving 
pattern (Id.) . Moreover, only after a right-hand turn by Defendant 
onto 250 North, did Officer Scott initiate a stop of Defendant's 
truck (Id. at R. 68, p. 16, lines 10-13) . Even if the reasonable 
suspicion, if any, provided by way of the information communicated to 
police dispatch by Ms. Smith did not dissipate upon Officer Scott's 
deliberate delay and failure to act forthwith upon the police 
dispatch information, Officer Scott's total disregard of the tip by 
Ms. Smith together with his subsequent actions in an effort to 
manufacture his own independent basis for reasonable suspicion caused 
the information provided by Ms. Smith to dissolve for purposes of the 
seizure of Defendant's truck. This is further supported by Officer 
Scott's own testimony at the suppression hearing that his basis for 
stopping Defendant's truck was not the information provided by Ms. 
Smith, but rather the alleged improper right-hand turn by Defendant 
(Id. at R. 68, pp. 16-17). 
Because Officer Scott intentionally disregarded the information 
provided by the police dispatch report and because Officer Scott did 
not in any way rely upon the police dispatch report in stopping 
Defendant's truck, the issue before this Court is whether the alleged 
improper right-hand turn provided Officer Scott with the requisite 
justification under the Fourth Amendment for stopping Defendant's 
truck. In State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157 (Utah Ct. App. 1997), a 
highway patrol trooper, while parked at a convenience store, viewed 
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a person approaching the store. Id. at 1158. In the course of 
viewing the person, the trooper observed the person almost fall going 
up the steps in the process of going directly to the bathroom. Id. 
According to the trooper, the person, who was a passenger, had "very 
red, glassy eyes," was "staggering off line,7' and appeared to be 
"very intoxicated." Id. Meanwhile, the driver of the car, who was 
wearing dark sunglasses, finished fueling the vehicle and went into 
the store wearing the sunglasses. Id. According to the trooper, the 
driver was also "walking off-line" in the course of going straight 
for the bathroom. Id. Shortly after the car drove away, the trooper 
pursued the car and initiated a stop of defendant's vehicle, in which 
the defendant was found to be in possession of controlled substances, 
drug paraphernalia, and open containers of alcohol. Jd. The Utah 
Court of Appeals, after examining the totality of the circumstances, 
determined that the trial court's four findings,13 when viewed 
objectively, did not "provide a sufficient basis to give rise to a 
reasonable suspicion" that the defendant was driving under the 
influence or that he was committing a crime. Jd. at 1160. Moreover, 
13The four findings utilized by the trial court to support its 
determination of reasonable suspicion included (1) defendant's 
continuing to wear sunglasses after he entered the store, (2) 
defendant and his passenger walking directly to the bathroom upon 
entering the store, (3) defendant's passenger being obviously 
intoxicated, and (4) defendant walking off-line when he entered the 
store and walked to the bathroom. State v. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d 1157, 
1159 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
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the Court noted that an "innocent explanation" could easily be given 
for each of the findings relied upon by the trial court. Id. 
In the instant case, Officer Scott failed to point to specific 
and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences 
from those facts, reasonably warranted the intrusion. See Menke, 787 
P.2d at 541 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S.Ct. at 1880); See 
also State v. Trujillo, 739 P.2d 85, 88 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citing 
Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 498, 103 S.Ct. 1319, 1324 (1983); 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1879 (1968); and State 
v. Christensen, 676 P.2d 408, 412 (Utah 1984)). Notwithstanding that 
Officer Scott based the stop Defendant's truck on an alleged improper 
right-hand turn, Officer Scott's own testimony at the suppression 
hearing, among other things, established the fact that Defendant in 
the course of making the right-hand turn did not cross over into any 
other lane of travel. Moreover, the testimony elicited during the 
suppression hearing established that Defendant's truck is a full-
size, three-quarter ton truck with a camper shell on the back that is 
difficult to turn close to a curb or edge of the roadway (R. 68, 
Transcript of Hearing, pp. 23-24).14 Indeed, the testimony at the 
suppression hearing established that by turning too close to the curb 
one might create an unreasonable risk to the public. Id. 
14Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-66(1) provides that "both a right turn 
and an approach for a right turn shall be made as close as practical 
to the right-hand curb or edge of the roadway." 
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Consequently, the size of Defendant's truck provides what could be 
considered an innocent explanation for the manner in which Defendant 
had to turn his truck in order to safely complete the turn. Tetmyer, 
947 P.2d at 1160. Moreover, the manner in which Defendant initiated 
the turn could have been affected by Defendant's nervousness at the 
time he was being followed by Officer Scott in the marked patrol car. 
As part of the totality of the circumstances to be considered in 
the instant case is the fact that Officer Scott did not observe any 
usual conduct on behalf of Defendant in the course of observing 
Defendant exit the restaurant and enter his truck (R. 68, Transcript 
of Hearing, pp. 14-15). Further, Officer Scott, as he followed 
Defendant, did not observe Defendant engage in any driving techniques 
or patterns indicative of an intoxicated driver. These circumstances 
should have operated to mitigate against any suspicions of 
intoxication. Tetmyer, 947 P.2d at 1161 n.l. 
Applying the aforementioned principles of law and authority to 
this case, the totality of the circumstances immediately preceding 
the stop of Defendant's truck does not support a reasonable suspicion 
that Defendant was involved in criminal conduct. Instead, the 
circumstances presented in this case "describe a very large category 
of presumably innocent travelers, who would be subject to virtually 
random seizures were [the Court] to conclude that as little 
foundation as there was in this case could justify a seizure." Reid 
v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441, 100 S. Ct. 2752, 2754 (1980). 
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Consequently, the conduct relied upon by Officer Scott to initiate 
the stop of Defendant truck was not indicative enough of criminal 
activity to establish articulable reasonable suspicion. Cf., e.g., 
State v. Carpena, 714 P.2d 674, 675 (Utah 1986) (per curiam); State 
v. Sykes, 840 P.2d 825, 828 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); and Trujillo, 739 
P.2d 85, 89-90 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).15 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant respectfully asks that this 
Court reverse the trial court's denial of Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress Evidence and remand the case for further proceedings 
consistent with this Court's opinion so that Defendant's 
constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches and 
seizures might be effectuated. 
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT 
AND METHOD OF DISPOSITION 
Defendant requests oral argument because oral argument will 
materially enhance the decisional process due to the significant 
issues in the instant appeal dealing with the constitutional right to 
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, which are matters of 
15Because Officer Scott did not articulate reasonable objective 
facts for suspecting Defendant had engaged in or was about to engage 
in criminal conduct, the balance between the public interest in crime 
prevention and constitutional right of Defendant to personal security 
and privacy tilts in favor of Defendant to protect him from the 
unreasonable police interference. 
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continuing public interest and which, based on the facts of the 
instant appeal, involve issues requiring further development in the 
area of criminal law case development for the benefit of bar and 
public. Counsel for Defendant further requests that the method of 
disposition of the instant appeal be by opinion designated by the 
Court "For Official Publication" for purposes of precedential value 
in future cases. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /flj day of October, 1998. 
XTH«1DLD & WIGGINS, P.C. 
Attorneys^£or Appellant 
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Addendum A 
TO STOP THE DEFENDANT OR QUESTION THE DEFENDANT. ULTIMATELY 
BEGAN TO LOOK FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION UPON WHICH HE COULD 
FURTHER BASE -- WELL, FOLLOW DETENTION TO THAT END. 
HE IN ADDITION INDICATED WHAT HE TESTIFIED WAS A 
TRAFFIC STOP BASED ON AN IMPROPER RIGHT TURN, ALTHOUGH 
ADMITTEDLY HE'S TESTIFIED IN COURT TODAY THAT MR. MCBRIDE DID 
NOT CROSS OVER THE LANE OF TRAVEL. HE WOULD HAVE THE COURT 
BELIEVE THAT HE SWUNG OUT FAR ENOUGH LEFT TO MAKE AN IMPROPER 
RIGHT-HAND TURN, BUT NOT FAR LEFT ENOUGH TO CROSS THE DIVIDING 
LINE. SO THERE SHOULD BE SOME QUESTION IN THE COURT'S MIND 
WHETHER THIS WAS A LEGITIMATE TRAFFIC STOP. WE'D ARGUE THAT 
THERE WAS NOT. 
THE COURT: MR. HARWARD? 
MR. HARWARD: NO. THE BRIEF COVERS THAT. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE COURT WOULD FIND FIRST OF 
ALL THAT THE LAW IS CLEAR THAT THE STOP MUST BE BASED UPON 
ARTICULABLE FACTS WHICH WOULD PROVIDE THE OFFICER WITH 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO BELIEVE THAT A CRIME WAS BEING COMMITTED. 
IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, DISPATCH HAD RECEIVED A REPORT FROM 
THE EMPLOYEE OF THE ARCTIC CIRCLE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL DRIVING A 
BROWN PICK UP TRUCK HAD COME IN TO THE ARCTIC CIRCLE. THAT 
PERSON WAS UNSTEADY ON HIS FEET. APPEARED TO HAVE SLURRED 
SPEECH AND WAS STAGGERING AND INDICATED TO THE DISPATCHER THAT 
PERSON WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL. 
THE OFFICER HAD THAT INFORMATION AND RESPONDED TO THE 
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1 II THEREFORE DENIES THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS. 
2 THE COURT WOULD REQUEST, MR. HARWARD, THAT YOU 
3 PREPARE FINDINGS AND ORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH MY RULING. HAS 
4 THIS MATTER BEEN SET FOR TRIAL. 
5 MS. THOMPSON: HAS BEEN SET ON THE DATE ON FEBRUARY 
6 11 AT NINE. I THINK THE COURT HAS ANOTHER MATTER THAT'S GOING 
7 TO GO. THE DEFENDANT IS IN CUSTODY. 
8 THE COURT: WE MAY HAVE ANOTHER JUDGE TO COVER. THE 
9 MATTER WILL REMAIN ON THE CALENDAR FOR NEXT WEDNESDAY AT 
10 ELEVEN O'CLOCK --OR EXCUSE ME -- AT NINE O'CLOCK. .JURY TRIAL 
11 HAS BEEN DEMANDED. WE'LL SEE IF ANOTHER JUDGE CAN HANDLE IT. 
12 IF HE CAN, THE MATTER WILL GO AS SCHEDULED. YOU HAVE TILL 
13 THURSDAY AT NOON TO REACH ANY AGREEMENT. IF NOT, WE'LL GO TO 
14 TRIAL AS CHARGED OR BE DISMISSED. BUT THERE WILL BE NO 
15 NEGOTIATION AFTER NOON ON FRIDAY. 
16 MS. THOMPSON: THURSDAY OR FRIDAY, JUDGE. 
17 THE COURT: EXCUSE ME. IT IS THURSDAY IS THE CUTOFF 
18 DATE. WE'LL LET YOU KNOW. RIGHT NOW THE MATTER GOES TO TRIAL 
19 ON THE 11TH. DO WE HAVE YOUR WORD TO BE HERE ON THAT DATE. 
20 || MR. MCBRIDE: YES, SIR. 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
30 
LOCATION. OBSERVED THE VEHICLE PARKED IN A PARKING SLOT, 
APPARENTLY THE LIGHTS ON AND IN AN OPERABLE CONDITION. HE 
PARKED ACROSS THE STREET. OBSERVED THE INDIVUDAL DESCRIBED 
COME OUT TO GET INTO HIS VEHICLE. THERE'S NO TESTIMONY AS TO 
HIS CONDITION AT THAT POINT. AND THEN OBSERVED THE VEHICLE 
PULL OUT SOUTHBOUND ON STATE STREET FROM THE AREA OF THE 
ARCTIC CIRCLE WHICH IS IN THE AREA OF 3 00 NORTH. HE PULLED 
BEHIND THE VEHICLE, OBSERVED THE VEHICLE GO SOUTHBOUND AND TO 
250 NORTH, MAKE A RIGHT-HAND TURN ON 250. 
ANY AREA ON STATE STREET IS TWO LANES GOING EACH WAY, 
AS I RECALL, AND A PARKING LANE ON EACH SIDE. THE EVIDENCE 
FROM THE OFFICER WAS THAT THE DEFENDANT'S VEHICLE WENT OUT 
NEAR THE DIVIDER LANE BETWEEN THE CENTER AND OUTSIDE LANE AND 
THEN TURNED TO THE LEFT GOING DOWN 250. 
THE COURT WOULD FIND THAT GIVEN THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF 
THE CONDITION WHICH WAS REPORTED TO THE OFFICER AND THE 
OBSERVED MANNER IN WHICH THE TURN WAS EXECUTED CONSTITUTED 
SUFFICIENT CAUSE TO STOP THE VEHICLE. CLEARLY UNDER THE 
RECENT SUPREME COURT CASES AS TO THE INFORMATION WHEREIN THE 
SUPREME COURT HAS INDICATED THAT THE MERE INDICATION OF A 
CITIZEN THAT THE DRIVER IS INTOXICATED IS SUFFICIENT TO 
PROVIDE THAT CAUSE. 
THE COURT FINDS THAT THE OFFICER HAD SUFFICIENT 
ARTICULABLE FACTS AVAILABLE TO HIM TO FORM THE NECESSARY 
PROBABLE CAUSE TO MAKE THE STOP IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE AND 
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Addendum B 
MELVIN C. WILSON 3513 
Davis County Attorney 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: 451-4300 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL Dl^TR^CT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MICHAEL CLEVE MCBRIDE, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT X 
Case No. 971701360 
Judge Rodney S. Page 
The above-entitled matter came on for sentence on the 17th 
day of March, 1998, the defendant being present in person and 
represented by his attorney, Laura Thompson, the State being represented 
by Carvel R. Harward, the Honorable Rodney S. Page, Judge, presiding. 
The defendant having been convicted upon a plea of guilty of 
the offense of Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or 
Drugs, a class B misdemeanor, and the Court having asked if the 
defendant had anything to say why judgment should not be pronounced, and 
no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the 
Court, 
IT IS ADJUDGED that the defendant is guilty of the offense of 
Driving While Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B 
misdemeanor, as charged and convicted. 
JUDGMENT ENTERED 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant be sentenced to the 
Davis County Jail for the term of six months, and is fined $1,000 as 
provided by law. 
IT IS FURTHER ADJUDGED that the defendant is granted a stay 
of execution of the above sentence and the defendant is placed on 
probation under the supervision of the Utah State Department of Adult 
Probation and Parole under the conditions required by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole to be set forth in an agreement and as 
ordered by the court, and to include the following: 
1. Spend five months in the Davis County Jail. After 
serving 120 days the Court will review for an inpatient alcohol 
treatment program. 
2. Fine of $1,000 and surcharge of 85 percent are to be paid 
through Adult Probation and Parole at a rate to be determined. 
3. The defendant is to enter and successfully complete an 
inpatient alcohol treatment program. 
DATED this j?/^*~ day of piaAcX^. r 1998. 
BY THE COURT: 
J-3 ^ - ^ -
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
Delivered an unexecuted copy of the foregoing Judgment this 
/£j day of March, 1998, to Laura Thompson, Attorney for Defendant. 
J&2 &2 W&<J 
